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Spatial versus Social Mismatch: The Strength of Weak Ties
* 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide a new mechanism based on social interactions explaining 
why distance to jobs can have a negative impact on workers’ labor-market outcomes, 
especially ethnic minorities. Building on Granovetter’s idea that weak ties are superior to 
strong ties for providing support in getting a job, we develop a model in which workers who 
live far away from jobs tend to have less connections to weak ties. Because of the lack of 
good public transportation in the US, it is costly (both in terms of time and money) to 
commute to business centers to meet other types of people who can provide other sources of 
information about jobs. If distant minority workers mainly rely on their strong ties, who are 
more likely to be unemployed, there is then little chance of escaping unemployment. It is 
therefore the separation in both the social and physical space that prevents ethnic minorities 
from finding a job. 
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* I am grateful to Joan de Marti for helpful comments. 1 Introduction
There is ample evidence showing that distance to jobs is harmful to workers, in particu-
lar, ethnic minorities. This is known as the “spatial mismatch hypothesis”. Indeed, ﬁrst
formulated by Kain (1968), the spatial mismatch hypothesis states that, residing in urban
segregated areas distant from and poorly connected to major centres of employment growth,
black workers face strong geographic barriers to ﬁnding and keeping well-paid jobs. In the
US context, where jobs have been decentralized and blacks have stayed in the central parts
of cities, the main conclusion of the spatial mismatch hypothesis is that distance to jobs is
the main cause of high unemployment rates. Since Kain’s study, hundreds of others have
been conducted trying to test the spatial mismatch hypothesis (see, in particular, the liter-
ature surveys by Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1998; Ihlanfeldt, 2006; Zenou, 2008). The usual
approach is to relate a measure of labor-market outcomes, typically employment or earnings,
to another measure of job access, typically some index that captures the distance between
residences and centres of employment. The general conclusions are: (a) poor job access
indeed worsens labor-market outcomes, (b) black and Hispanic workers have worse access to
jobs than white workers, and (c) racial diﬀerences in job access can explain between one-third
and one-half of racial diﬀerences in employment.
Despite this huge empirical literature, few theoretical models have been proposed (for
a survey on the theoretical literature, see Gobillon et al., 2007; Zenou, 2006b; 2009). The
standard approach is to use a search model to show that distant workers tend to search less
(due to lack of information about jobs or less opportunities to ﬁnd a job) and thus stay
longer unemployed (Coulson et al., 2001; Wasmer and Zenou, 2002).
In the present paper, we propose an alternative explanation. Building on Granovetter
(1973, 1974, 1983)’s idea that weak ties are superior to strong ties for providing support in
getting a job,1 we develop a model in which workers who live far away from jobs tend to
have less connections to weak ties. As underscored by Granovetter, in a close network where
everyone knows each other, information is shared and so potential sources of information
are quickly shaken down so that the network quickly becomes redundant in terms of access
to new information. In contrast Granovetter stresses the strength of weak ties involving a
secondary ring of acquaintances who have contacts with networks outside ego’s network and
1In his seminal papers, Granovetter (1973, 1974, 1983) deﬁnes weak ties in terms of lack of overlap in
personal networks between any two agents, i.e. weak ties refer to a network of acquaintances who are less
likely to be socially involved with one another. Formally, two agents A and B have a weak tie if there is
little or no overlap between their respective personal networks. Vice versa, the tie is strong if most of A’s
contacts also appear in B’s network.
2therefore oﬀer new sources of information on job opportunities.2
Our explanation of the spatial mismatch is that distant (black) workers live in neigh-
borhoods with closed networks that are limited in getting information about possible jobs.
Because of the lack of good public transportation in the US, it is costly (both in terms of
time and money) to commute to business centers to meet other types of people (weak ties)
who can provide other source of information about jobs. If distant (black) workers mainly
rely on their (black) strong ties and if the latter are unemployed, there is then little chance
of escaping unemployment and ﬁnding a job. In other words, in our framework, ethnic mi-
norities experience higher unemployment rate because they are separated both in the urban
and the social space.
This is the ﬁrst aim of our paper. The second aim is to provide a uniﬁed theory linking
the urban and the social space. Indeed, social interactions are a key aspect of everyday’s life.
People interact with each other to exert social activities, exchange information about jobs,
etc. These interactions, in particular in the labor market, tend to be localized. For instance,
using Census Tract data for Chicago in 1980 and 1990, Topa (2001) ﬁnds a signiﬁcantly
positive amount of social interactions across neighboring tracts, especially for areas with
a high proportion of less educated workers and/or minorities. Bayer et al. (2008) also
document that people who live close to each other, deﬁned as being in the same census
block, tend to work together, that is, in the same census block.3 In order to understand the
interactions between the labor and the land market and the role of social networks, a model
incorporating all these elements is needed. Indeed, households make trade-oﬀs among the
opportunity for social interaction, commuting costs, and housing costs in deciding residential
location. This, in turn, aﬀects their opportunities in the labor market. The second aim of
this paper is therefore to develop a model where social interaction, labor and land market
aspects are all explicitly taken into account.
To be more precise, we consider a dynamic model of the labor market in which dyad
members do not change over time so that two individuals belonging to the same dyad hold a
2The existing empirical evidence lends some support to Granovetter (1995)’s ideas. Yakubovich (2005)
uses a large scale survey of hires made in 1998 in a major Russian metropolitan area and ﬁnds that a worker is
more likely to ﬁnd a job through weak ties than through strong ones. These results come from a within-agent
ﬁxed eﬀect analysis, so are independent of workers’ individual characteristics. Using data from a survey of
male workers from the Albany NY area in 1975, Lin et al. (1981) ﬁnd similar results. Lai et al. (1998) and
Marsden and Hurlbert (1988) also ﬁnd that weak ties facilitate the reach to a contact person with higher
occupational status, who in turn leads to better jobs, on average. See also Patacchini and Zenou (2008) who
ﬁnd evidence of the strength of weak ties in crime.
3See also Ioannides and Topa (2010).
3strong tie with each other. However, each dyad partner can meet other individuals outside
the dyad partnership, referred to as weak ties or random encounters. By deﬁnition, weak
ties are transitory and only last for one period. The process through which individuals learn
about jobs results from a combination of a socialization process that takes place inside the
family (in the case of strong ties) and a socialization process outside the family (in the case
of weak ties).4 Thus, information about jobs is essentially obtained through strong and
weak ties and thus word-of-mouth communication.5 Workers commute to a business center
to work and to interact with other people. We ﬁnd that housing prices increase with the
level of social interactions in the city because information about jobs is transmitted more
rapidly and, as a result, individuals are more likely to be employed and to be able to pay
higher land rents. We also show that workers using more their weak ties than strong ties to
ﬁnd a job receive a higher wage.
We then extend this framework by endogeneizing social interactions. We ﬁnd that workers
living far away from jobs pay lower housing prices but experience higher unemployment
rates than those living close to jobs because they mainly rely on their strong ties to obtain
information about jobs.
This last result is important because it allows us to provide a theoretical mechanism
explaining why residents in certain neighborhoods may be stuck in high unemployment
‘traps’ since they mostly exchange information with their strong ties, who are themselves
likely not to possess much useful information about job opportunities. Since most blacks in
the United States tend to live further away from jobs (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1998), then
this model could explain why they have diﬃculty leaving unemployment. In our model, it
is due to the fact that they mainly interact with their strong ties (other blacks) and very
little with their weak ties (whites) so that their information about jobs is limited since blacks
tend to be more unemployed and have poorer social networks than whites (see, e.g. Wial,
1991). This is related to Putman (2007) who ﬁnds that higher levels of ethnic homogeneity
are associated with higher level of trust.6 In other words, blacks will not interact with
4This idea was ﬁrst put forward by Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) in the context of the transmission of
a trait like, for example, religion or identity.
5Resorting to word of mouth and newspaper ads are two major job-search methods used by unemployed
workers (see e.g. Holzer, 1987, 1988; Wahba and Zenou, 2005). Word of mouth, in particular, seems to be
of crucial importance: almost 70 percent of the jobs obtained by white workers and almost 60 percent of
those obtained by black workers are found by checking with relatives or friends or through direct application
without referral (Holzer, 1987). For a summary of the evidence, see Ioannides and Loury (2004) and Topa
(2011).
6Other studies have also found that socioeconomic diversity is associated with lower level of trust (Alesina
and la Ferrera, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2000). See the literature review by Costa and Kahn (2003).
4whites (and vice versa) because they do not trust each other. In our framework, they do
not interact with each other because they are physically separated and, as a result, it is
too costly for blacks to interact with whites (weak ties). Dawkins (2006) underscores this
result by noticing that social networks may also inﬂuence the rate of residential mobility,
if households are reluctant to move away from particular locations when local social ties
are strong. We assume that strong ties are always of the same race (family, best friends)
and there is no spatial costs of interacting with them because they tend to live in the same
neighborhood. On the contrary, weak ties can be of either race and meeting them implies a
commute to the center of activities. Our main result shows that a separation in the physical
space (due, for instance, to housing discrimination) can have dramatic consequences for
blacks’ outcomes. In other words, even if black and white workers are totally identical in
terms of income, commuting costs, job-information rate, job-destruction rate, etc., then if
blacks are separated from whites in the geographical space by living further away from jobs,
they will experience very diﬀerent unemployment rates.
Related literature
There is a growing interest in theoretical models of peer eﬀects and social networks (see
e.g. Akerlof, 1997; Glaeser et al., 1996; Ballester et al., 2006; Calv´ o-Armengol et al., 2009),
especially in the labor market.7 However, few models of social networks in the labor market
are dynamic. Montgomery (1994) and Calv´ o-Armengol et al. (2007) propose a dynamic
model of weak and strong ties but the former focuses on inequality while the latter on the
interaction between crime and labor markets. Calv´ o-Armengol and Jackson (2004) have a
more general network analysis (since they can encompass any network structure) but do
not model the urban space. To the best of our knowledge, there are nearly no theoretical
papers in which social interactions in the labor market are embedded in an urban space.8 An
exception is Selod and Zenou (2006) but there is no explicit analysis of the social network.
In the present paper, we use the basic framework of Calvo-Armengol et al. (2007) to
incorporate the urban space. Compared to this paper, we endogeneize wages, which allows
us to derive a positive relationship between wages and social interactions, and social inter-
actions, which allows us to establish a negative relationship between social interactions and
distance to jobs. We also explicitly model the interactions between black and white workers
in both the urban and social space. All these three new aspects are crucial to explain the
stylized facts described at the beginning of this introduction. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst theoretical paper that explicitly models both the urban and the social space
7See the excellent literature review by Ioannides and Loury (2004).
8See Ioannides (2011, Chap. 5) who reviews the literature on social interactions and urban economics.
5in a uniﬁed framework. It has to be emphasized that this combination is diﬃcult because
social networks consider a ﬁnite number of individuals (Vega-Redondo, 2007; Goyal, 2007;
Jackson, 2008) while the urban monocentric city model has a continuum of individuals (Fu-
jita, 1989; Fujita and Thisse, 2002; Zenou, 2009). Our model can be seen a ﬁrst step towards
this direction. One the one hand, the network is extremely simpliﬁed since we only con-
sider dyads, i.e., individuals belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups. On the other,
because of dyads, we can develop a dynamic model, an essential feature of labor markets.9
2 The model
Consider a population of individuals of size one.
Dyads We assume that individuals belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups, re-
ferred to as dyads. We say that two individuals belonging to the same dyad hold a strong
tie to each other. We assume that dyad members do not change over time. A strong tie is
created once and for ever and can never be broken. Thus, we can think of strong ties as
links between members of the same family, or between very close friends.
Individuals can be in either of two diﬀerent states: employed or unemployed. Dyads,
which consist of paired individuals, can thus be in three diﬀerent states,10 which are the
following:
(i) both members are employed −we denote the number of such dyads by d2;
(ii) one member is employed and the other is unemployed (d1);
(iii) both members are unemployed (d0).
Aggregate state By denoting the employment rate and the unemployment rate at time
t by e(t) and u(t), where e(t),u(t) ∈ [0,1], we have:
￿
e(t) = 2d2(t) + d1(t)
u(t) = 2d0(t) + d1(t)
(1)
9There are some recent papers that combine social interactions and urban spatial structure (Helsley and
Strange, 2007; Brueckner and Lagey, 2008). However, in all these papers, the social network is not explicitly
modelled. Social interactions are captured by externalities and only average eﬀects are considered.
10The inner ordering of dyad members does not matter.
6The population normalization condition can then be written as
e(t) + u(t) = 1 (2)
or, alternatively,




Social interactions Time is continuous and individuals live for ever. We assume repeated
random pairwise meetings over time. Matching can take place between dyad partners or not.
At time t, each individual can meet a weak tie with probability ω(t) (thus 1 − ω(t) is the
probability of meeting his strong-tie partner at time t).11 In Sections 2 to 5, we assume
these probabilities to be constant and exogenous, not to vary over time and thus, they can
be written as ω and 1 − ω. We endogeneize ω in section 6 below. Observe that strong ties
and weak ties are assumed to be substitutes, i.e. the more someone spends time with weak
ties, the less he has time to spend with his strong tie.
We refer to matchings inside the dyad partnership as strong ties, and to matchings
outside the dyad partnership as weak ties or random encounters. Within each matched pair,
information is exchanged, as explained below. Observe that we assume symmetry within
each dyad, that is if I meet a strong (or a weak) tie, then my strong (or weak) tie has to
meet me. In the language of graph theory, this means that the network of relationships is
undirected (Jackson, 2008).
Information transmission Each job oﬀer is taken to arrive only to employed workers,
who can then direct it to one of their contacts (through either strong or weak ties). This is a
convenient modelling assumption, which stresses the importance of on-the-job information.12
The gist of the analysis would be preserved if this assumption is relaxed. To be more precise,
employed workers hear of job vacancies at the exogenous rate λ while they lose their job at
the exogenous rate δ. All jobs and all workers are identical (unskilled labor) so that all
employed workers obtain the same wage. Therefore, employed workers, who hear about a
job, pass this information on to their current matched partner, who can be a strong or a
weak tie. Thus, information about jobs is essentially obtained through social networks.
11If each individual has one unit of time to spend with his friends, then ω(t) can also be interpreted as
the percentage of time spent with weak ties.
12There is strong evidence that ﬁrms rely on referral recruitment (Bartram et al. 1995; Barber et al., 1999;
Mencken and Winﬁeld, 1998; Pellizzari, 2010) and it is even common and encouraged strategy for ﬁrms to
pay bonuses to employees who refer candidates who are successfully recruited to the ﬁrm (Berthiaume and
Parsons, 2006).
7This information transmission protocol deﬁnes a Markov process. The state variable is
the relative size of each type of dyad. Transitions depend on labor market turnover and
the nature of social interactions as captured by ω. Because of the continuous time Markov
process, the probability of a two-state change is zero (small order) during a small interval of
time t and t + dt. This means, in particular, that both members of a dyad cannot change
their status at the same time. For example, two unemployed workers cannot ﬁnd a job
at the same time, i.e. during t and t + dt, the probability assigned to a transition from
a d0−dyad to a d2−dyad is zero. Similarly, two employed workers (d2−dyad) cannot both
become unemployed, i.e. switch to a d0−dyad during t and t + dt. This applies to all other
dyads mentioned above.
Flows of dyads between states It is readily checked that the net ﬂow of dyads from





d2(t) = h(e(t))d1(t) − 2δd2(t)
•
d1(t) = 2g(e(t))d0(t) − [δ + h(e(t))]d1(t) + 2δd2(t)
•
d0(t) = δd1(t) − 2g(e(t))d0(t)
(4)
where h(e(t)) ≡ [1 − ω + ω e(t)]λ and g(e(t)) ≡ ω e(t)λ.
Let us explain in details these equations. Take the ﬁrst one. Then, the variation of dyads
composed of two employed workers (
•
d2(t)) is equal to the number of d1−dyads in which the
unemployed worker has found a job (through either his strong tie with probability (1 − ω)λ
or his weak tie with probability ωe(t)λ) minus the number of d2−dyads in which one of
the two employed workers has lost his job. In the second equation, the variation of dyads
composed of one employed and one unemployed worker (
•
d1(t)) is equal to the number of
d0−dyads in which one of the unemployed workers has found a job (only through his weak
tie with probability g(e(t)) since his strong tie is unemployed and cannot therefore transmit
any job information) minus the number of d1−dyads in which either the employed worker
has lost his job (with probability δ) or the unemployed worker has found a job with the help
of his strong or weak tie (with probability h(e(t))) plus the number of d2−dyads in which
one the two employed has lost his job. Finally, in the last equation, the variation of dyads
composed of two unemployed workers (
•
d0(t)) is equal to the number of d1−dyads in which
the employed worker has lost his job minus the number of d0−dyads in which one of the
unemployed workers has found a job (only through his weak tie, with probability g(e(t)))
These dynamic equations reﬂect the ﬂows across dyads. Graphically,
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Figure 1: Flows in the labor market
Observe that the assumption stated above that both members of a dyad cannot lose their
status at the same time is reﬂected in the ﬂows described by (4). What is crucial in our
analysis is that members of the same dyad (strong ties) always remain together throughout
their life. So, for example, if a d2−dyad becomes a d0−dyad, the members of this dyad are
exactly the same; they have just changed their employment status.
Taking into account (3), the system (4) reduces to a two-dimensional dynamic system in





d2(t) = h(e(t))d1(t) − 2δd2(t)
•
d1(t) = 2g(e(t))(1/2 − d2(t) − d1(t)) − [δ + h(e(t))]d1(t) + 2δd2(t)
where, using (1):
e(t) = 2d2(t) + d1(t)
3 Steady-state equilibrium analysis
A steady-state equilibrium requires solving simultaneously two problems:
(i) (steady state) labor ﬂows (referred to as a labor market equilibrium);
(ii) a location and rental price outcome (referred to as an urban land use equilibrium)
For convenience, we expose ﬁrst the steady-state labor market equilibrium and then the
urban land use equilibrium.
3.1 Labor-market equilibrium
In a steady-state (d∗
2,d∗
1,d∗
0), each of the net ﬂows in (4) is equal to zero. Setting these net
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that equations (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) are satisﬁed.
Deﬁne Z = (1 − ω)/ω, B = δ/(λω). We have the following result.
Proposition 1
(i) There always exists a steady-state equilibrium U where all individuals are unemployed
and only d0−dyads exist, that is d∗
2 = d∗
1 = e∗ = 0, d∗
















− B − Z > 0, (11)
0 < u∗ < 1 by (9), and 0 < d∗


































10If condition (10) holds, then an interior equilibrium always exists. Indeed, the job-
destruction rate δ has to be not too large and the job-contact rate λ high enough for the
interior equilibrium to exist. Otherwise, all workers will be unemployed and the steady-state
equilibrium U will prevail. The latter is obviously uninteresting and, from now on, we only
focus on the labor market equilibrium I.












0Z + (1 + Z)B
￿
> 0
since when the job-destruction rate δ increases, more people lose their jobs and the number
of dyads d∗




















and this sign is ambiguous. Indeed, when δ increases, two opposite forces are at work.
Remember that e∗ = 2d∗
2 + d∗
1. When δ increases, there is a negative eﬀect on both d∗
2 and
d∗
1 since the two persons involve in the d∗
2−dyad and the employed person involved in the
d∗
1−dyad have more chance to lose their jobs (see (4)). There is also a positive eﬀect on d∗
1
since if one of the persons involves in the d∗
2−dyad loses his job, then the d∗
2−dyad becomes
a d∗
1−dyad (see (4)), which increases the number of d∗
1−dyads.13
3.2 Urban land-use equilibrium
Consider a continuum of equally productive workers uniformly distributed along a linear and
closed city. All land is owned by absentee landlords and all ﬁrms are exogenously located in
the Business District (BD hereafter). The BD is a unique employment center located at one
end of the linear city. In a centralized city, it corresponds to the Central Business District,
whereas in a completely decentralized city, it represents suburban employment. Workers are
risk neutral, optimally decide their place of residence between the BD and the other end of
the city, and all consume the same amount of land (normalized to 1 for simplicity). Without
loss of generality, the density of residential land parcels is taken to be unity, so that there
are exactly x units of housing within a distance x from the BD. As stated above, the total
population is normalized to 1.
13If we further look at the impact of the job-information rate λ on e∗, the eﬀect is also ambiguous for the
same reason. In Proposition 4 below, we also analyze the impact of weak ties ω on e∗.
11Each individual is identiﬁed with one unit of labor. Each employed worker goes to the
BD to work and incurs a ﬁxed monetary commuting cost τ per unit of distance. When living
at a distance x from the BD, he also pays a land rent R(x), consumes 1 unit of land and
z1 unities of the non-spatial composite good (which is taken as the numeraire so that its
price is normalized to 1) and earns a wage y. The wage is assumed to be exogenous.14 For
example, one could think of a minimum wage that is exogenously ﬁxed by the government.
The instantaneous (indirect) utility of an employed worker located at a distance x from the
BD is equal to:
V1(x) = y − τ x − R(x) (15)
Unemployed workers have lower commuting costs than the employed workers. One way
to justify this assumption is that the unemployed workers tend to use cheaper transport
mode (public transit) than the employed workers (who are more likely to take their cars).15
Another justiﬁcation is that the unemployed workers have a lower opportunity cost of time
than the employed, which implies that their commuting costs are lower. As a result, we
assume that the unemployed workers incur a commuting cost sτ per unit of distance, where
0 < s ≤ 1. The instantaneous (indirect) utility of an unemployed worker residing at a
distance x from the BD is therefore equal to:
V0(x) = b − sτ x − R(x) (16)
where b < y is the unemployment beneﬁt. We assume that b is exogenously ﬁnanced by
taxpayers who reside elsewhere (for example absentee landlords).
We are now able to calculate the expected utility of each worker. To do that, as in Zenou
(2006a), we assume perfect capital markets with a zero interest rate.16 As a result, workers
engage in income smoothing as they cycle in and out of unemployment. Thus, workers save
while employed and draw down their savings when out of work, with their consumption
expenditure reﬂecting average income. This means that all workers have identical disposable
incomes, equal to the average income over the job cycle. To compute this income, observe
that a worker spends a fraction e∗(ω) = d∗
1 + 2d∗
2 of his time employed and a fraction
14This wage will be endogeneized in Section 5 below.
15For evidence on this, see e.g. Bhat (1997).
16When there is a zero interest rate, workers have no intrinsic preference for the present so that they only
care about the fraction of time they spend employed and unemployed. Therefore, the expected utilities are
not state dependent.
121 − e∗(ω) = 2d∗
0 + d∗
1 of his time unemployed. Therefore, the expected utility of a worker
residing in x is given by:
EV (x) = e
∗(ω)V1(x) + [1 − e
∗(ω)]V0(x)
Using (15) and (16), this expected utility can be written as:
EV (x) = e
∗(ω)(y − τx) + [1 − e
∗(ω)](b − sτx) − R(x) (17)
where e∗(ω) is given by (11). Observe that, in order to write this expected utility, we have im-
plicitly assumed that, because workers are able to smooth their income over time, a worker’s
residential location remains ﬁxed as he enters and leaves unemployment. Other models have
assumed that changes in employment status involve changes in residential location (Zenou,
2009). Which assumption is more relevant may depend on the nature of the labor market
considered. When unemployment and employment spells are short (i.e. a U.S. style labor
market), assuming that workers change their residential relocation as soon as they change
job is not necessarily appealing. Indeed, even though residential mobility in the U.S. is quite
high,17 only a small fraction (5.6%) of people move within a county for job-related reasons
(see Table 2 in Rupert and Wasmer, 2009). However, in a European context, long spells
of employment and unemployment make it more likely that relocation and labor transitions
coincide, in which case the assumption of absence of mobility costs would be relevant. In
the present model, we have chosen the assumption of high-relocation costs because we have
the US situation in mind.
Let us now solve the urban land use equilibrium. The timing is as follows. Assume
that there is an initial situation when workers pick locations without knowing their initial
employment status. They will not change location afterwards. Then, given zero discounting
and income smoothing, people bid for rents given that they anticipate the time they will
spend in each employment state. Thus, the whole structure of the analysis is: (i) initial
period location determination; (ii) ensuing labor market shocks resulting in unemployment,
wage, etc. In equilibrium, because of the competition in the land/housing market, all ex
ante identical workers will obtain the same expected utility EV . It should be clear that
the presence of high-relocation costs means that there is no bidding after initial location
decisions.
We now need to calculate the bid rent of workers Ψ(x,EV ), which is deﬁned as the
maximum land rent that a worker is willing to pay at a given location x so as to reach a
17Rosenthal (1988) shows that in the United States, the median renter moves roughly every one to two
years, while the median homeowner moves every six to seven years. Even if it is not explained why people
move, this shows a high level of residential mobility in the United States, at least for renters.
13given level of utility EV . By solving (17) in R(x) = Ψ(x,EV ) for the utility level EV , we
easily obtain the following linear bid rent function:
Ψ(x,EV ) = e
∗(ω)(y − τx) + [1 − e





∗(ω) + [1 − e
∗(ω)]s]τ < 0
Indeed, in this model, bid rents compensate workers for their expected commuting costs.
Those who live close to jobs pay higher land rents because they have lower pecuniary costs
whether they are employed or not while those who live far away from jobs have the reverse.
By normalizing the agricultural land to zero and by noticing that the size of the city is equal
to 1, we have the following deﬁnition:














The ﬁrst equation guarantees that the land rent is continuous everywhere in the city while
the second equation is such that absentee landlords allocate land to the highest bidders.
Solving (18) and (19) gives:




∗(ω)(y − τ) + [1 − e
∗(ω)](b − sτ) (20)
and for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
R
∗(x) = {e
∗(ω) + [1 − e
∗(ω)]s}τ (1 − x) (21)
We can deﬁne the general equilibrium where both the steady-state interior labor and
urban land-use equilibria are solved for simultaneously. Ignoring the equilibrium U, we have
the following result:






,R∗(x)) are respectively determined by (9), (11),
(12), (13), (14), (20) and (21).
144 Social interactions
The most interesting results of this model is the impact of social interactions (captured by









and consider steady-state equilibrium I. Then, increasing the percentage of weak ties ω








The eﬀects of ω on d∗
1 and on d∗
2 are, however, ambiguous.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Here, individuals belong to mutually exclusive groups, the dyads, and weak tie interac-
tions spread information across dyads. The parameter ω measures the proportion of social
interaction that occurs outside the dyad, the inter-dyad interactions. When ω is high, the
social cohesion between employed and unemployed workers is high and thus they are in close
contact with each other. In this context, increasing ω induces more transitions from un-
employment to employment and thus u∗, the unemployment rate in the economy decreases.
This is true if (22) holds.18 This condition (22) also guarantees that (10) holds, i.e. that an
interior steady-state equilibrium I exists (see the Appendix). Condition (22) states that the
job-destruction rate δ has to be low enough while the job-contact rate λ and social interac-
tions ω have to be large enough. As a result, we are in a “reasonable” economy where jobs
are not destroyed too fast and jobs are created at the suﬃcient high rate (otherwise we will
end up with the steady-state equilibrium U where all workers are unemployed). Take our
model and interpret the unit time as one quarter of a year. In the US, the sample average
for the quarterly job destruction rate is 5.5% (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992), thus δ = 0.055.
We know from most studies that λ = 4, which means that on average people hear from a job
every three weeks. In that case, condition (22) is always satisﬁes even for very low values of
ω, like e.g. ω = 0.01.
Even though u∗ decreases, the eﬀect of ω on d∗
2 and d∗
1 is ambiguous. Indeed, from Figure
1, individuals leave dyad d1 and enters dyad d2 at rate h(e) ≡ (1 − ω + ωe)λ. Since
∂ [(1 − ω + ωe)λ]
∂ω




18Even if (22) does not hold, it can still be true since (22) is a suﬃcient condition.
15is ambiguous (because −1 + e < 0), the eﬀects mentioned above are also ambiguous. Now
consider the eﬀect of ω on d∗
0. This is clearly negative. Indeed, from Figure 1, one can see










then, when ω increases, there are fewer d0−dyads.
Proposition 5 Assume (22) and consider steady-state equilibrium I. Then, increasing the
percentage of weak ties ω increases both the price of land (and housing) everywhere in the
city and the utility level of all workers, i.e.
∂R∗(x)
∂ω





Indeed, when the strength of weak ties ω increases, people ﬁnd jobs more easily and
thus spend more time employed during their lifetime. As a result, there are able to bid
more for land and thus the competition in the land market becomes ﬁercer. Consequently,
the price of housing increases at each location in the city. Because the positive impact
of ω on employment is large enough to outweigh the negative eﬀect of the land rent, the
expected utility increases with an increase in ω. The eﬀect of weak ties on the land rent is
an interesting and new result. It is though simple and intuitive since it says that if there are
more social interactions in an area, then information about jobs is transmitted more rapidly
and, as a result, more people would be employed and land rents would be higher.19
In the broader context of the search literature, the results of Proposition 5 illustrate
the fact that anything that reduces search frictions in the labor market is going to increase
employment and hence expected incomes and land rents. The interesting feature here is that
it makes this connection explicit in the speciﬁc context of labor market referrals.
19There is a recent paper by Fu (2005) who tests in some sense this result. Fu (2005) uses the 1990
Massachusetts census data and estimates hedonic housing model with social amenities. He found that an
increase in the percentage of new residents has signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on property values. He concludes
that this is “probably due to the strength of weak ties”. Of course, it could also be consistent with other
aspects such as, for example, gentriﬁcation. The results of a direct empirical test of the impact of social
interactions on land rents will be very interesting and will help us to verify if the prediction of our model is
correct.
16In Section 6 below, we show that the results of Proposition 5 hold across diﬀerent neigh-
borhoods or diﬀerent ethnic groups that may diﬀer in their prevalence of weak versus strong
ties. Indeed, we show that workers living further away from jobs have lower interactions
with weak ties, and, as a result, spend less time employed. This, in turn, implies that they
pay lower land rents as compared to those residing closer to jobs. Since black workers tend
to live further away from jobs than other ethnic groups, especially whites, this could explain
why they are less likely to be employed and pay lower rents. To show that they experience
lower expected utility, it suﬃces to introduce some heterogeneity, like e.g. discrimination or
diﬀerence in human capital.20
5 Endogenous wages
In this section, we endogenously determine the wage y. For that, we use an eﬃciency wage
model (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) where ﬁrms set wages to deter shirking. There are only
two possible eﬀort levels: either the worker shirks, exerts zero eﬀort, a = 0, and contributes
to zero production, or he does not shirk, provides full eﬀort, a > 0, and contributes to 1 unit
of production.
On the incentive mechanism of the eﬃciency wage model, there is plenty of empirical
evidence. Basically this model stipulates that employees are rational cheaters who anticipate
the consequences of their actions and shirk when the marginal beneﬁt exceeds the costs,
and ﬁrms respond to this decision calculus by implementing monitoring and incentive pay
policies (i.e. eﬃciency wage) that make shirking unproﬁtable. Cappelli and Chauvin (1991)
ﬁnd that higher wage premiums are associated with lower levels of shirking, as measured
by disciplinary dismissals. Using data from the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY) in 1992, Goldsmith et al. (2000) ﬁnd that receiving an eﬃciency wage enhances an
individual’s eﬀort and that individuals providing a greater eﬀort earn higher wages.21 Recent
research has used a natural experiment setting in which monitoring levels are exogenously
varied across similar sites and substantial resources are devoted to tracking the behavior of
employees. Fehr et al. (1996) were the ﬁrst to use a natural experiment and show that higher
wages indeed sharply reduce shirking. More recently, Nagin et al. (2002) propose another
experiment by collecting data from a large telephone solicitation company. They show that
a signiﬁcant fraction of employees behave according to the predictions of the shirking model.
20We discuss these ethnic issues in detail in Section 7.
21See also Rebitzer (1995), who ﬁnds that high levels of supervision are associated with lower wage levels,
and Strobl and Walsh (2007), which results indicate a positive relationship between monitoring and eﬀort.
17Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that these employees respond to a reduction in the perceived cost of
opportunistic behavior by increasing the rate at which they shirk.22
As before, there is a stochastic process in employment status changes. However, ﬁrms
cannot perfectly monitor workers, so there is a rate at which shirking is detected, denoted by
m (i.e. monitoring rate). If a worker is caught shirking, he is automatically ﬁred. As a result,
for non-shirkers, the stochastic process is as before and described by Figure 1. However, for
shirkers, it is as in Figure 1 with one diﬀerence: δ is replaced by δ + m, since shirkers can
lose their jobs either because there is a technological shock that leads to the destruction of
the job or because the worker has been caught shirking and ﬁred. The rest of the stochastic
process is exactly the same as in the previous section. In particular, the way workers ﬁnd
a job and transmit information within and outside the dyad is the same. As a result, the
employment rate for non-shirkers, e∗(ω) = eNS(ω) is still given by (11), while that of shirkers
eS∗(ω) is deﬁned by (11), where δ is replaced by δ + m.
We can now write the expected utilities. For a non shirker located at a distance x from
the BD, his expected utility is equal to:
EV
NS(x) = e
∗(ω)(y − a − τx) + [1 − e
∗(ω)](b − sτx) − R(x) (23)
whereas, for a shirker residing at a distance x from the BD, it is given by:
EV
S(x) = e





(b − sτx) − R(x) (24)
The trade oﬀ between shirking and non shirking is clear: shirkers do not provide eﬀort a
but spend more time unemployed. Let us calculate the eﬃciency wage. Firms know that
workers have a zero discount rate, so, at each x, they solve EV NS(x) = EV S(x). By using
(23) and (24), we easily obtain the following eﬃciency wage:
y
eff = b + a
e∗(ω)
[e∗(ω) − eS∗(ω)]
+ (1 − s)τx (25)
Equation (25) is also referred to as the non-shirking condition. The information available to
ﬁrms about workers’ residence matters in the process of wage formation. If ﬁrms perfectly
observe the residential location of all workers, then they will set the wage (25) at each
location x. In ﬁrms do not perfectly observe the residential location of all workers in the
city, then, to prevent shirking, they will set the highest possible wage, i.e. the one for the
22There is a recent paper by Fehr and Goette (2007) using an experiment in a laboratory that shows that
workers work more when wages are higher.
18worker located at the city fringe x = 1. In that case, the eﬃciency wage for all workers will
be given by:
y
eff = b + a
e∗(ω)
[e∗(ω) − eS∗(ω)]
+ (1 − s)τ (26)
This is the case we consider now,23 i.e. ﬁrms do not have perfect information on workers’
residence.24 This eﬃciency wage has the standard properties of non-spatial models (Shapiro
and Stiglitz, 1984). Indeed, when b, a, or δ increases, or m decreases (these are the non-
spatial eﬀects), the eﬃciency wage has to increase in order to prevent shirking. The spatial
aspect of the wage is determined by the positive relationship between (eﬃciency) wages
and commuting costs. Indeed, when someone shirks, only the gain in commuting costs is
(positively) aﬀected by x, the distance to jobs. So, the further away from the BD a worker
resides, the higher the beneﬁt of shirking in terms of commuting costs. As a result, if ﬁrms
want to induce workers not to shirk at each x, they have to increase the wage for workers living
further away from jobs in order to exactly compensate the additional gain from shirking,
that is (1 − s)τx. In the case of imperfect information, the spatial compensation is for the
worker located at x = 1 and it is thus equal to (1 − s)τ.
What is new in the present model is the impact of social interactions ω on wages. The
term
e∗(ω)
e∗(ω)−eS∗(ω) captures the incentive aspect of the eﬃciency wage,25 i.e. the amount
necessary to prevent shirking. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), it is a function of employ-
ment (or unemployment) since unemployment acts as a worker discipline device. Denote
∆e∗ ≡
e∗(ω)−eS∗(ω)
e∗(ω) > 0, i.e. the diﬀerence in employment rates between shirking and non-
shirking behaviors, then
y
eff = b +
a
∆e∗ + (1 − s)τ
Indeed, the higher the diﬀerence in employment rate between shirking and non-shirking
behaviors, the less workers are induced to shirk, and the lower is the eﬃciency wage needed


















23The case of perfect infomation is straightforward to analyze.
24It is also the more realistic case since workers can misreport their residential address.
25Observe that, by deﬁnition, e∗(ω) > eS∗(ω).
19as the elasticity of shirking employment with respect to weak ties. We have the following
result:
Proposition 6 Assume (22) and consider steady-state equilibrium I. Then
∂yeff
∂ω





When interactions with weak ties ω increase, whether they shirk or not, workers are on
average more employed over their lifecycle. However, if the responsiveness of employment
to ω is higher for shirkers than non-shirkers, then ﬁrms need to increase the eﬃciency wage
to deter shirking. This is an interesting result because it links social interactions and wages.
In particular, it says that, if workers use more their weak ties than strong ties (strong ties
than weak ties) to ﬁnd a job, then they will receive higher wages if the elasticity of shirking
(non-shirking) employment with respect to weak ties is higher than that of non shirking
(shirking).
If we look at the empirical literature, the following relationship has been tested: do people
who got their job through social contacts earn more or less than their peers who found a job
using formal methods? The empirical results are not clear. Using data from across Europe
and from three US cities (Boston, Atlanta and Los Angeles), Bentolila et al. (2010) found
that, on average, people who obtained their job through social contacts ﬁnd work more
quickly but earned about 5 to 7 per cent less than their peers. Using the same data but
looking at this relationship country by country, Pellizzari (2010) found that informal search
channels lead to signiﬁcantly better paying jobs in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands,
while the opposite is true in Greece, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom. In the other
EU countries - and in the US - no signiﬁcant wage diﬀerence is observed.
In all these studies, however, one cannot distinguish between weak and strong ties since
social contacts are measured by “family, friends or other contacts”. Our model predicts
that the eﬀects of strong and weak ties on wages are, in fact, diﬀerent. There is some
empirical evidence showing that the use of weak ties in job search tends to lead to higher
wage outcomes (Granovetter, 1974), but the evidence is not very robust. Green et al. (1995)
ﬁnd that incomes are lower for those who use within-neighborhood ties, or ties to relatives,
which, as in our model, tend to be strong rather than weak links. Green et al. (1999)
ﬁnd that the use of strong ties is negatively associated with annual earnings, especially for
Hispanics. Bridges and Villemez (1986) also ﬁnd that weak ties are linked to higher incomes
than strong ties; however, the income eﬀect of tie strength is greatly reduced when controls
are added for education, experience, race, and gender.
20Our model also provides a new mechanism explaining this relationship. Indeed, previous
theoretical research on the role of contacts in the labor market emphasizes that people
may have higher wages because they inform the employer about the worker (Saloner, 1985;
Montgomery, 1991), because they allow workers to more eﬀectively sample a given wage
distribution (Mortensen and Vishwanath, 1994; Calv´ o-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; 2007),
or because they provide a cheaper search channel (Holzer, 1988). Bentolila et al. (2010)
propose another type of model that emphasizes the fact that workers may sacriﬁce their
productive advantage so as to ﬁnd a job more easily, which can explain why jobs found
through social contacts exhibit a wage reduction rather than a premium. Our mechanism
is diﬀerent since it is based on the possibility of shirking behavior by workers and how the
employment of shirkers and non-shirkers react to an increase in the use of weak ties in ﬁnding
a job.
As in the standard eﬃciency wage model, we can close the model by modelling the
behavior of ﬁrms. Consider M identical ﬁrms (j = 1,...,M) in the economy. All ﬁrms
produce the same composite good and sell it at a ﬁxed market price p (this good is taken as
the numeraire and its price p is set to 1). Firms only care of workers’ productivity on the
job and their main objective is to prevent shirking because it is very costly (workers produce
nothing if they shirk).26 On the contrary, each worker, whatever his location, contributes to
one unit of production if he does not shirk (which will always be true in equilibrium). The
production function of each ﬁrm j is: F(lj) and it is assumed that F(·) is twice diﬀerentiable,
with F(0) = 0, F ￿(·) > 0 and F￿￿(·) ≤ 0, and it satisﬁes the Inada conditions, i.e. F￿(0) = +∞
and F￿(+∞) = 0.
Since all ﬁrms are identical, let us focus on a symmetric (steady-state) equilibrium in
which each ﬁrm employs the same number of workers. This means that each ﬁrm j hires
Lj = L = e∗(ω)/M workers, where e∗(ω) is given by (11). As a result, each ﬁrm adjusts




L∗ M − eS(ω)
+ (1 − s)τ = F
￿(L
∗) (27)
Because of the assumptions made on the production function, it is easy to show that there
exists a unique solution in L∗. Because L∗ = e∗(ω)/M, and e∗(ω) is given by (11), M will
adjust so that L∗ = e∗(ω)/M will be always true in equilibrium.
26Because ω has an impact on the eﬃciency wage, one could argue that ﬁrms could hire people depending
on how they ﬁnd a job. We assume that ﬁrms do not know if workers have found a job through their weak
or strong ties. As a result, when deciding wage and employment, each ﬁrm takes ω as given.
216 Social interactions and distance to jobs
We would like now to endogeneize ω and to provide a new mechanism explaining why distance
to jobs can lead to adverse labor-market outcomes. We ﬁrst postulate a negative relationship
between ω and distance to jobs x. We will then derive this relationship endogenously by
letting workers choosing optimally ω. In this section, for simplicity, we will consider the
wage y as exogenous. Making it endogenous as in the previous section will not change any
of our main results but will make the analysis more cumbersome.
6.1 Exogenous relationship between weak ties and distance to jobs
It should be clear that the relationships with strong ties are, in general, stronger closer to
where people live while relationships with weak ties are more intense closer to business and
shopping centers (see, for example, Ioannides and Topa, 2010). To capture these ideas, it is
now assumed that ω is a decreasing function of x, i.e. ω(x) with ω￿(x) < 0.27,28 As expressed
by Glaeser (2000), “social inﬂuences decay rapidly with distance”. For example, Topa (2001)
and, more recently, Bayer et al (2008) found evidence of signiﬁcant social interactions op-
erating at the block level.29 In our model, these are interactions between strong ties since
they are repeated over time. On the contrary, having contact with weak ties, deﬁned as
relationships with random encounters that are not repeated over time, are more likely to
take place in dense and animated areas. We assume here that ω￿(x) < 0, meaning that there
are more interactions in the business district (BD) with weak ties than further away from
the BD.30 Sigelman et al. (1996), for the US, show that most superﬁcial encounters occur
while shopping, going to bars, and the like. So, basically, the closer people are from the
business district, the more likely they interact with random encounters (weak ties). Simi-
larly, Holland et al. (2007) show that public places located in the center of London (UK),
are important areas of social interactions. In particular, social mixing takes place there
where people of diﬀerent income and ethnic groups tend to interact with each other. Also,
27We can further assume that ω(1) = 0 and ω(0) = 1, which implies that, at the BD (x = 0), individuals
interact only with weak ties while at the city fringe (x = 1), they interact only with strong ties. This is not
necessary for our main results.
28In section 6.2 below, ω will be endogeneously chosen by individuals and we will show under which
condition ω is a negative function of x.
29See also Kan (2007) who shows social capital to be very local.
30Using a diﬀerent model, Helsey and Strange (2007) model social interactions in a more “extreme” way
since all social interactions occur at a single location (the “center”) and are deﬁned as the number of visits
to the center.
22Henning and Lieberg (1996) investigate the structure of networks and the content of ties in
selected neighborhoods in Link¨ oping, Sweden. Strong ties were those of importance to the
respondent and which were characterized by regular contact. Weak ties consisted of nodding
acquaintances and conversational contacts. Henning and Lieberg found that neighborhood
where people live was relatively unimportant in weak ties relationships for both white-collar
and blue-collar residents - three quarters of contacts were outside the local area. All this
evidence indicate that interactions with weak ties do not take place where people reside but
rather close to business and shopping centers.
In that case, Proposition 1 is exactly as before with one diﬀerence, which is that all
endogenous variables (i.e. u∗, e∗, d∗
0, d∗
1 and d∗
2) are now a function of x and not of ω (and
of course a function of all the other exogenous variables). In particular, this means that, if



















Indeed, for individuals living far away from jobs, it is less likely for them to meet weak ties
who can provide information about jobs. So, for example, if someone is unemployed and
belongs to a d0−dyad, then the only persons who can provide information about jobs are
weak ties. But if this person lives far away from the BD, he will not be very much in contact
with weak ties, and therefore will have little information about jobs.
In that case, the expected utility can be written as:
EV (x) = e
∗(x)(y − τx) + [1 − e
∗(x)](b − sτx) − R(x) (30)
and thus the bid rent function is given by:
Ψ(x,EV ) = e
∗(x)(y − τx) + [1 − e
∗(x)](b − sτx) − EV (31)






[y − b − (1 − s)τx] − (1 − s)τe
∗(x) − sτ (32)
which is strictly negative since 0 < e∗(x) < 1 and e∗(x) = 1 − u∗(x), ∀x ∈ [0,1]. The role of
the land rent is now to compensate remote locations for both higher commuting costs and
higher unemployment rates.
Adopting the same deﬁnition of equilibrium as in Deﬁnition 2, we obtain:
23Proposition 7 At the urban land use equilibrium where social interactions ω is a function
of distance to jobs x, we obtain:
EV
∗ = e
∗(1)(y − τ) + [1 − e
∗(1)](b − sτ) (33)
and for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
R
∗(x) = e
∗(x)[y − b − (1 − s)τx] − e
∗(1)[y − b − (1 − s)τ] + sτ (1 − x) (34)





d2(t) = h(e(t))d1(t) − 2δd2(t)
•
d1(t) = 2g(e(t))d0(t) − [δ + h(e(t))]d1(t) + 2δd2(t)
•
d0(t) = δd1(t) − 2g(e(t))d0(t)





So the only diﬀerence with the previous sections is that, when calculating the aggregate ﬂows
in the labor market, we use the average time workers spend with their weak ties, that is ω.
In Section 7, when we introduce black and white workers, we fully develop this approach.
To summarize, when the relationship to weak ties is decreasing with distance to jobs,
individuals who are close to the BD obtain a lot of information about jobs, spend little time
in a d0−dyad (where both friends are unemployed) and experience low unemployment rate.
On the contrary, those who live far away from jobs spend most of their time with strong
ties and thus get little information from weak ties. This means that when they belong to a
d0−dyad, where their best friend is also unemployed, they have little chance of ﬁnding a job
and are stuck in the unemployment state. This is why they experience higher unemployment
rates.
6.2 Choosing social interactions
We would like now to extend the model so that ω is chosen by individuals and not exoge-
neously deﬁned as in the previous sections. The timing is as in the previous section. We
assume that there is some cost of interacting with weak ties. Let c denotes the marginal
24cost of these interactions. The expected utility is still given by (17) but we need to add the
interaction costs. We have:
EV (ω,x) = e
∗(ω)(y − τx) + [1 − e
∗(ω)](b − sτx) − R(x) − cω
where e∗(ω) is deﬁned by (11). Each individual optimally chooses ω that maximizes EV (ω,x).






[y − b − (1 − s)τx] − c = 0
We assume that the second order condition always holds, i.e.
∂2e∗(ω)
∂ω2 < 0
Observe that y − b − (1 − s)τx > 0, ∀x ∈ [0,1], and we have seen (see Proposition 4) that
if (22) holds, then
∂e∗(ω)
∂ω > 0. We have the following result:
Proposition 8 Assume (22) and consider steady-state equilibrium I. Then there exists a
unique interior ω∗ that maximizes EV (ω,x) and
(i) workers living further away from jobs will interact less with weak ties than those residing
















Workers want to interact with weak ties because it increases their probability to be
employed (or, equivalently, the time they spend employed during their lifetime), i.e.
∂e∗(ω)
∂ω >
0. However, because it is always more expensive to commute to the business district when
employed than when unemployed (i.e. τ > sτ), the marginal gain of interacting with weak
ties is higher for workers residing closer to jobs than for those locating further away. To be
more precise, when x increases, the (spatial) cost of employment, (1 − s)tx, increases while
25the gain of employment decreases at the margin since
∂2e(ω)
∂ω2 < 0. As a result, people living
further away from jobs ﬁnd it optimal to interact less with weak ties and more with their
strong ties.
Concerning wage y and unemployment beneﬁt b, a higher y or b increases the value of
employment and, since e∗(ω) and ω are positively related, workers will interact more with
weak ties. The same intuition applies for commuting costs τ.
The model can be closed as in the previous section. What is interesting is that all

























As before, workers residing further away will spend more time unemployed over their lifecycle.
Also, higher unemployment beneﬁts or commuting costs leads to higher unemployment.
These results are conformed to the intuition, even though the mechanisms are new.
7 Spatial mismatch and the strength of weak ties
We would like now to extend our model to incorporate black and white workers and to
analyze the impact of segregation in the physical and social space on their labor-market
outcomes.
7.1 The model
There is a continuum of black and white workers whose mass is given by NB and NW, with
NB + NW = N.31 We use here the model of Section 6.1 where it was assumed that ω is a
decreasing function of x, i.e. ω(x) with ω￿(x) < 0. In other words, we do not endogeneize
wages (as in Section 5) and do not derive the relationship between ω and x (as in Section
6.2). The model is getting quite complicated so to keep it tractable we only use its main
ingredients.
As before, individuals belong to dyads. We assume that strong ties are always of the same
race (family, best friends) and there is no spatial costs of interacting with them32 because
31Subscripts B and W stand for “Black” and “White”.
32As highlighted in Section 6.2, there can be social costs of interacting with strong ties.
26they tend to live in the same neighborhood. On the contrary, weak ties can be of either race
and meeting them implies a commute to the center of activities, here the BD. By denoting
the employment level and the unemployment level of workers of type j = B,W at time t by
Ej(t) and Uj(t), we have: ￿
Ej(t) = 2d2j(t) + d1j(t)
Uj(t) = 2d0j(t) + d1j(t)
The population condition can then be written as
Ej(t) + Uj(t) = Nj
As before, we denote the employment rate and the unemployment rate of workers of type








uj(t) = 1 − ej(t)
or, alternatively,




As in the previous sections, each job oﬀer is taken to arrive only to employed workers,
who can then direct it to one of their contacts (through either strong or weak ties). Employed
workers (black or white) hear of job vacancies at the exogenous rate λ while they lose their job
at the exogenous rate δ.33 Employed workers, who hear about a job, pass this information on
to their current matched partner, who can be a strong or a weak tie. White (black) employed
workers pass the job information to their white (black) strong tie and to any (white or black)
weak tie.
We need to solve simultaneously the land/housing market and the labor market. In this
section, it is more convenient to solve ﬁrst the urban land use equilibrium and then the
steady-state labor market equilibrium.
33We could have assumed that λ is race speciﬁc so that λW > λB, i.e. whites hear more about job
opportunities than blacks because they are better connected (“old boy” networks). This will just reinforce
our results.
277.2 Urban land use equilibrium
We assume that blacks face housing discrimination in the housing market, as documented
by Yinger (1986, 1997). To keep the model tractable, the analysis focuses on a situation
where housing discrimination is so strong that landlords in the area close to the BD refuse to
rent to blacks under any circumstances. In other words, blacks are prevented from living in
the interval [0,NW] regardless of their willingness to pay for land in this area. The resulting
“restricted” residential pattern and the associated bid-rent curves are shown in Figure 2.34
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Figure 2: Urban-land use equilibrium with black and white workers
34We could have obtained a similar urban conﬁguration by, for example, assuming that whites have higher
income than blacks so that their time transportation costs will be higher than those of black workers.










(b − sτx) − R(x)
As can be seen from this equation, blacks and whites are totally identical in terms of income,
transport costs, housing consumption, etc.35 The only diﬀerence between the two types of
workers is due to the fact that blacks are discriminated against in the housing market while
whites are not. The bid rent function of a type−j individual is then given by:
Ψj(x,EV j) = e
∗
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then workers living further away from jobs will experience lower employment rates and thus,
on average, higher commuting costs. This means that whites’ bid rents are steeper than
blacks’ bid rents. We can now deﬁne the urban land-use equilibrium as follows:























at each x ∈ (0,N] (38)
Equations (36) and (37) reﬂect the equilibrium conditions in the land market. Equation
(36) says that, in the land market, at the frontier NW, the bid rent oﬀered by white workers
is equal to the bid rent oﬀered by black workers. Equation (37), in turn, says that the
bid rent of black workers at the city-fringe must be equal to the agricultural land, which is
normalized to zero. Finally, as in the previous section, equation (38) deﬁnes the equilibrium
land rent as the upper envelope of the equilibrium bid rent curves of all workers and the
agricultural rent line. Observe that housing discrimination does not aﬀect the housing prices
35We could introduce diﬀerences in these variables but this would just reinforce our results.
29paid by blacks because their bid rents are ﬂatter than that of whites, who would have paid
lower rents had they live at the periphery.
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W(x)[y − b − (1 − s)τx] − e∗
B(N)[y − b − (1 − s)τN] for 0 ≤ x ≤ NW
−[e∗
W(NW) − e∗
B(NW)][y − b − (1 − s)τNW] + sτ (N − x)
e∗
B(x)[y − b − (1 − s)τx] − e∗
B(N)[y − b − (1 − s)τN] + sτ (N − x) for NW < x ≤ N
We have the following result:
Proposition 9 In the urban conﬁguration described in Deﬁnition 3, whites spend more time
with weak ties than blacks do, that is ωW(x) > ωB(x), ∀x ∈ [0,N]. This is, of course, also













This proposition is a consequence of housing discrimination and the fact that the time
spent with weak ties is a decreasing function of the distance to jobs, i.e. ω￿
j(x) < 0. We
know from Section 6.2 that ω￿
j(x) < 0 is a result of a choice since the marginal gain of
interacting with weak ties is higher for workers residing closer to jobs than for those locating
further away. In other words, this proposition links the physical and the social space since
it says that separation in the physical space (here through housing discrimination) leads to
separation in the social space, i.e. individuals living far away from jobs will mainly interact
with their strong ties. In the context of black and white workers, this proposition shows that
30housing discrimination by separating black and white workers in the physical space does also
separate them in the social space since black workers will ﬁnd optimal not to commute to
the BD to interact with weak ties and thus with whites.
There is some evidence that residents of high poverty neighborhoods rely more on strong
ties, and on more geographically concentrated networks and thus less on weak ties. Elliot
(1999) shows that less educated workers in high poverty neighborhoods are twice as likely
to have found a job through neighbors (local contacts in the same group of city blocks)
than in low poverty areas; this is consistent with evidence on the geographic concentration
of social networks of poorer individuals, as reported in Fischer (1982) and Kadushin and
Jones (1992). Moreover, jobholders in high poverty areas are more likely to have found jobs
through strong rather than weak ties than in low poverty places (73% vs. 48%).
Observe that, as explained in Section 3.2, the BD (Business District) is the unique em-
ployment center located at one end of a linear city. In a centralized city, it corresponds
to the Central Business District, whereas in a completely decentralized city, it represents
suburban employment. In the United States, black families tend to live in the city center
while whites are more likely to reside in the suburbs. Even if there are jobs in the center,
the jobs that low-skill black workers need are mostly located in the suburbs. This is the
situation we are capturing here where black workers live far away to the BD, i.e. the loca-
tion where jobs are. For example, Raphael and Stoll (2002, Table 1) have categorized all
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the US according to the severity of their spatial
mismatch, which measures the spatial imbalance between jobs and residential locations us-
ing an index of dissimilarity. In their measure, the dissimilarity index ranges from 0 to 100,
with higher values indicating a greater geographic mismatch between populations and jobs
within a given metropolitan area. For instance, a dissimilarity index of 50 for blacks means
that 50 percent of all blacks residing in the metropolitan area would have had to relocate to
diﬀerent neighborhoods within the metropolitan area in order to be spatially distributed in
perfect proportion with jobs. Table 1 documents the spatial segregation of black workers in
the US by giving the value of this dissimilarity index (denoted by SM) for both black and
white families. It is easily seen that segregation/spatial mismatch of black families is very
severe in the US, especially in big cities.36
36% Pop: Percentage of (black or white) individuals in the population in the MSA or PMSA; SM: Mea-
sure of the Spatial Mismatch (for black or white) between people and jobs using the Raphael’s and Stoll’s
dissimilarity index. % Un: Percentage of (black or white) male unemployed in the MSA or PMSA.
31Table 1: Spatial mismatch in American MSAs in 2000
Blacks Whites
% Pop SM % Un % Pop SM % Un Population
Atlanta, GA MSA 29 54 8.98 63 40 3.09 4,112,198
Baltimore, MD, PMSA 27 52 11.69 67 37 3.05 2,552,994
Chicago, IL PMSA 19 69 17.27 66 34 4.18 8,272,768
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH, PMSA 19 62 14.09 77 31 4.17 2,250,871
Detroit, MI, PMSA 23 71 14.89 71 36 4.27 4,441,551
Houston, TX, PMSA 17 57 10.85 61 40 4.46 4,117,646
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA, PMSA 10 62 15.57 49 37 6.64 9,519,338
Miami, FL, PMSA 20 65 13.44 70 36 6.23 2,253,362
New York, NY, PMSA 25 70 14.63 49 44 5.61 9,314,235
Newark, NJ, PMSA 22 65 13.90 66 34 3.96 2,032,989
Oakland, CA, PMSA 13 55 12.08 55 37 3.95 2,392,557
Philadelphia, PA-NJ, PMSA 20 64 13.93 72 34 4.47 5,100,931
Saint Louis, MO-IL, MSA 18 63 14.21 78 38 4.11 2,603,607
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV, PMSA 26 56 8.64 60 42 2.63 4,923,153
Source: Raphael and Stoll (2002) and Census (2000), calculations from the author.
7.3 Labor-market equilibrium
We would like now to analyze the consequence of the “double” separation of black workers
(Proposition 9) on their labor-market outcomes. Let us write the ﬂows of dyads between





d2j(t) = hj(t)d1j(t) − 2δd2j(t)
•
d1j(t) = 2g(x,t)d0j(t) − [δ + h(x,t)]d1j(t) + 2δd2j(t)
•
d0j(t) = δd1j(t) − 2g(x,t)d0j(t)
(41)













and with ωB < ωW (Proposition 9). Indeed, when calculating the aggregate ﬂows in the la-
bor market for each type of workers, we use the average time workers of each type spend
with their weak ties, that is ωj, which are deﬁned by (39) and (40). Let us explain the ﬁrst
equation since the interpretation of the other equations is similar. The variation of dyads
composed of two employed workers of type j (
•
d2j(t)) is equal to the number of d1j−dyads
in which the unemployed worker of type j has found a job through either his strong tie of







minus the number of d2j−dyads in which one of the two employed workers has lost his job.







λ for workers of type j. When a person of type j = B,W who
spends on average ωj of his time with weak ties goes to the BD, he can meet a weak tie
who is either an employed black worker who is aware of a job opportunity with probability
NB
N eB(t)λ or an employed white worker who is aware of a job opportunity with probability
NW
N eW(t)λ. In other words, there is no meeting bias with weak ties but there is a strong
meeting bias with strong ties (since a person of type j only meets his strong tie belonging
to the same race j all his life). This is to capture the idea that people are born with a
type j and interacts with strong ties of the same type j because they are either members
of the family or very close friends met during the childhood. On the contrary, individuals
meet weak ties randomly by going to bars, doing sport activities or shopping in the BD.
In that case, they meet randomly other people of either race. We could have assumed, like
for example in Currarini et al (2009), a meeting bias (the probability to meet an employed
weak tie who is informed for a black individual would be ωj
￿NB





0 < m < 1 and likewise for whites) but this would complicate the analysis without changing
our main results.
Taking into account (35), the system (41) reduces to a two-dimensional dynamic system





d2j(t) = hj(t)d1j(t) − 2δd2j(t)
•
d1j(t) = 2gj(t)[Nj/2 − d2j(t) − d1j(t)] − [δ + hj(t)]d1j(t) + 2δd2j(t)
where
Nj ej(t) = 2d2j(t) + d1j(t)
In a steady-state (d∗
2j,d∗
1j,d∗
0j), each of the net ﬂows in (41) is equal to zero. Setting these



















































j = 1 − e
∗
j (46)
The model is much more complicated now because e∗
B and e∗
W enter both in each dyad of each
type j of worker and, as a result, we cannot analyze the steady-state equilibrium separately
for black and white workers. We have the following result:
Proposition 10
(i) There always exists a steady-state equilibrium U where all individuals are unemployed
and only d0j−dyads exist, that is d∗
2j = d∗
1j = e∗
j = 0, d∗
0j = Nj/2 and u∗
j = 1 for
j = B,W.
(ii) All the other steady-state equilibria are interior, that is 0 < e∗
B < 1 and 0 < e∗
W < 1.







0B (1 − ωB) − 2λ2ωWd∗
0W (1 − ωW)
2λ[ωBd∗
0B (λωB + δ) + ωWd∗
0W (λωW + δ)]
(47)
Furthermore, if the separation in the physical space for blacks is suﬃciently high (mean-











then the employment rate (unemployment rate) of black workers is lower (higher) than





This proposition formally proves the intuition developed earlier. If black workers are
suﬃciently separated in the physical space, then they will mainly interact with their black
strong ties and will therefore have very little interaction with weak ties, especially whites.
Weak ties are an important source of job information and when black individuals miss it,
they end up having a higher unemployment rate than whites. This is a vicious circle since
blacks experience a higher unemployment rate and mostly rely on other black workers who
also experience a high unemployment rate, etc. Since jobs are mainly found through social
networks via employed friends, black individuals are stuck in their location with no job. In
particular, those residing far away from jobs, will mainly rely on their weak ties. As a result,
34when they found themselves in a d0−dyad, they have nearly no chance of leaving it since
the only way out is to meet an employed weak tie. As underscored by Granovetter (1973,
1974, 1983), in a close network where everyone knows each other, information is shared and
so potential sources of information are quickly shaken down so that the network quickly
becomes redundant in terms of access to new information. In contrast Granovetter stresses
the strength of weak ties involving a secondary ring of acquaintances who have contacts
with networks outside ego’s network and therefore oﬀer new sources of information on job
opportunities. To summarize, when the time spent with weak ties is low, the social cohesion
between employed and unemployed workers is also low and thus they are not in close contact
with each other. Therefore, little interaction with weak ties induces more transitions from
employment to unemployment and thus the unemployment rate increases.
Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo (2006) elaborate the various network mechanisms by
which minorities can be isolated from good job opportunities. Using unique data from one
employer, they examine multiple steps in the chain of network referral processes originating
from employees to the applicants for entry-level jobs at this employer. They study access to
a set of desirable jobs that are within reach of candidates with modest levels of education
and skills. By examining the minority versus non-minority representation in the pool of
people who could potentially originate word-of-mouth networks to this employer, they ﬁnd
relatively large percentages of Asian Americans and Hispanics, but small percentages of
African Americans, available to refer others in this setting.





W are obtained when blacks and whites are assumed to be totally
identical (in terms of wage, commuting costs, job-destruction rate, job-information rate,
etc.). In a world where job information ﬂows through word-of-mouth communication, the
diﬀerences in employment and unemployment rates between blacks and whites are only
caused by the separation in the physical space due to housing discrimination. The analysis
thus generates a link between unemployment and a seemingly unrelated phenomenon: racial
discrimination in the housing market. Because the model is diﬃcult to solve analytically, we
would like now to run some numerical simulations highlighting the impact of segregation on
labor-market outcomes of black workers.
7.4 Numerical simulations
Take our model and interpret the time period as one quarter of a year. The job destruction
rate is equal to δ = 0.1, that is, workers keep on average their job for 2 years and 6 months.
Remember that these are unskilled jobs. The job information rate is equal to λ = 0.8, which
35means that an employed worker is aware about a job every 3 months (and 20 days). We
ﬁx the total population to N = 1,000 with 20 percent blacks and 80 percent whites, i.e.






which is decreasing in x, with ω(0) = 1 and ω(N) = 0. This implies that, for whites, the









































































































W is given by (47).
The results of the simulations are displayed in Table 2. As can be seen in this table, the
only (ex ante) diﬀerence between blacks and whites is their location in the geographical space.
Since housing consumption has been normalized to 1, the city size is equal to N = 1,000.
The area where whites live is between x = 0 and x = 800 and the area where blacks reside is
between x = 800 and x = 1,000. As a result, the average time spent with weak ties is only
10 percent for black workers while it is 60 percent for white workers. At the steady-state
36equilibrium, this initial diﬀerence translates into large diﬀerences in labor-market outcomes
between these two populations. First, the unemployment rate of black workers is nearly
twice as much as that of white workers (22 versus 13 percent). This can be explained by
the fact that black families spend more than 13 percent of their time in a d0 dyad37 while
whites spend only 2.6 percent of their time in this type of dyad. Interestingly, because λ is
relatively high (employed workers of either race hears of a job opportunity every 3 months),
black workers do also spend a lot of time in a d2 dyad (69 percent) where both strong ties
are employed.
Table 2: Steady-state equilibrium

















This ﬁrst result highlights the large diﬀerent outcomes between blacks and whites mainly
due to the separation of the former in the physical space. We would like now to see more
closely how the increase in segregation aﬀects these outcomes. For that, we vary NW, which
measures the size of the area where whites live, and analyze its impact on the labor market.
Notice that by increasing NW and by keeping N ﬁxed, we reduce the size of the black
population but, more importantly, we increase ω∗
W and reduce ω∗
B. Figure 3 displays the
results for the unemployment rates. In this ﬁgure and all the ﬁgures below, the solid line
corresponds to outcomes of black workers while the dashed line to that of white workers.
37For the interpretation of the results, it is better to use 2d∗
0j/Nj than d∗
0j since the former is normalized
and gives the time spent in a d0 dyad. The same applies for d∗
1j and d∗
2j.










Figure 3: Eﬀect of segregation on unemployment rates.
It can be seen that increasing segregation is mainly detrimental to blacks, which expe-
rience an increase in their unemployment rate from 15.5 percent (when there are as many
blacks as whites in the population, i.e. NB = NW = 500 and ωB = 0.25, ωW = 0.75) to
more than 90 percent when there is a majority of whites (i.e. NB = 100 and NW = 900
and ωB = 0.05, ωW = 0.55). Observe that, by increasing NW whites also suﬀer, since their
ωW decreases but by only 26.67 percent while blacks experience a reduction of 80 percent in
their average time they spend with weak ties. Interestingly, for whites, the unemployment
rate is nearly unaﬀected by the increase in segregation since it increases from 13 percent to
13.35 percent. Let us understand better this sharp increase in the black unemployment rate
by looking at the changes in the diﬀerent dyads when NW increases. Figures 4, 5, and 6
show these results for the d0−dyads, d1−dyads and d2−dyads, respectively.








Figure 4: Eﬀect of segregation on the time spent in d0 dyads.
It is striking to see that one of the main eﬀects of increasing segregation is that blacks
spend much more time in d0−dyads, meaning that both strong ties are unemployed and can
only ﬁnd a job through their weak ties. In Figure 4, it can be seen that black workers spend
5.8 percent of their time in d0−dyads when NB = NW = 500 while this number increases to
more than 23 percent when NB = 100 and NW = 900. In the latter, this is a very diﬃcult
situation since, on average, black workers meet weak ties only 5 percent of their time (i.e.
ωB = 0.05). This is why the unemployment rate is as high as 90 percent since there is
extremely little chance for them of escaping unemployment. Indeed, in a d0 dyad, both
strong ties are unemployed and these workers only meet weak ties 5 percent of their time.
This highlights the vicious circle we put forward in the Introduction. If black workers do
not have access to weak ties (especially whites), in particular because they are segregated
and separated from business centers, then their main source of information about jobs will
be provided by their strong ties. But if the latter are themselves unemployed, the chance of
escaping unemployment will be very low.










Figure 5: Eﬀect of segregation on the time spent in d1 dyads.
Figures 5 and 6 analyze the impact of segregation on the time spent in d1−dyads and
d2−dyads, respectively. It can be seen again that blacks are mostly aﬀected by the increase
in segregation while whites are not. In particular, the time spent in d1 and d2−dyads, where
either one or two persons in the dyad is employed, sharply decreases with the increase of
segregation.












Figure 6: Eﬀect of segregation on the time spent in d2 dyads.
We have also performed other numerical simulations to see how robust our results are.38
For example, instead of taking the decreasing and linear function (49), we have also used
the following decreasing but convex function of social interactions: ω(x) = 1/(1 + x), which
disadvantages even more distant workers. In that case, all results remain qualitatively un-
changed. We have also run other simulations with diﬀerent job-destruction rates δ and
job-information rates λ and still ﬁnd the same qualitative results.
To sum up, our model highlights the fact that minority workers, especially blacks, are
both cut oﬀ from employment opportunities (because of distance to jobs) and are embedded
in the “wrong” network, that is, they tend to overuse networks (i.e. strong ties) that lead to
no job at all. For example, Kasinitz and Rosenberg (1996) argue that poor, black residents of
the Red Hook section of Brooklyn are cut oﬀ from good jobs on the waterfront. Since people
tend to be hired into these jobs only through connections to union members who already
work there, and since few African Americans are currently employed on the waterfront, they
argue that African Americans are missing the connection to these jobs. Similarly, Newman
(1995, 1999) in her studies of Harlem’s low-wage service workers argues that black youth
also rely on networks in their job ﬁnding, but that these networks tend to lead them to
low-paying jobs.
38These simulations are available upon request.
418 Discussion and policy implications
Because of the results of the previous section, our model can provide a mechanism explaining
why black workers, who tend to live far away from jobs in the United States, experience high
unemployment rates. Our explanation of the spatial mismatch is that distant (black) workers
live in neighborhoods based on closed networks, which are limited in getting information
about possible jobs. Because of the lack of good public transportation in the US, it is costly
(both in terms of time and money) to commute to business centers to meet other types of
people who can provide other source of information about jobs. If distant (black) workers
mainly rely on their strong ties and if the latter are unemployed, there is then little chance
to escape unemployment and to ﬁnd a job.39
Our result is also related to that of Calv´ o-Armengol and Jackson (2004). Contrary to the
present model where only a very speciﬁc network structure (i.e. the dyad) is assumed, they
explicitly model a social network (which can have any possible structure) where information
ﬂows between individuals having a link with each other. They show that an equilibrium
with a clustering of workers with the same status is likely to emerge since, in the long run
(i.e. steady state), employed workers tend to be friends with employed workers. Apart
from the fact that there is no urban space, the main diﬀerence with our approach is that
individuals exchange job information only with their strong ties (as deﬁned by their direct
friends). In their model, weak ties (as deﬁned by friends of friends) will indirectly help
individuals because, by providing job information to their strong ties, they help them to
become employed. The two approaches are complementary. In Calv´ o-Armengol and Jackson
(2004), if because of some initial condition some black workers are unemployed, then in
steady-state they will still be unemployed because both their strong and weak ties will
also be unemployed. In our framework, it is segregation and distance to a business center
that make black workers only interacting with strong ties, who are themselves likely to be
unemployed.
Our model is mainly based on the fact that blacks are segregated in the physical space,
residing far away from jobs (see, for example, Table 1 in Section 7.2 for evidence) and that
job information exchange is localized (either you talk to your strong ties who live in the
same neighborhood40 or you meet randomly people in the job-activity center). We have
39Even if this is beyond the scope of this paper, our model could also explain the emergence of a “black
culture” in areas far away from jobs since distance to jobs induces the black population to rely mostly on
strong ties.
40See e.g. Wellman (1996) who ﬁnds that 42% of yearly contacts in individual networks took place with
neighbors that lived less than one mile away. See also Guest and Lee (1983), Otani (1999), Conley and Topa
42shown that, even if black and white workers are totally identical, black segregation will
create stark diﬀerences in unemployment rates between blacks and whites. Interestingly,
using conﬁdential longitudinal data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY), Weinberg et al. (2004) investigate the presence of social interaction eﬀects at the
neighborhood level on labor market activity. They also examine the possibility that any
correlation in outcomes across neighborhood residents may be explained by the “spatial
mismatch” hypothesis. They ﬁnd that a one standard deviation increase in access to jobs
(the spatial mismatch hypothesis) is associated with a 3.6% increase in annual hours worked.
Similarly, Card and Rothstein (2007) ﬁnd that, holding constant family background and
other factors, a shift from a fully segregated to a completely integrated city closes about
one-quarter of the raw black-white gap in SAT scores.
Our analysis oﬀers interesting policy implications. We have shown that the neighborhood
and distance to jobs are crucial in understanding labor-market outcomes of ethnic minorities.
In that case, neighborhood regeneration policies are the right tool to use. Such policies
have been implemented in the US and in Europe through the enterprise zone programs
(Papke, 1994; Boarnet and Bogart, 1996; Mauer and Ott, 1999; Bondonio and Engberg,
2000; Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2007) and the empowerment zone programs (Busso and
Kline, 2008). For example, the enterprise zone policy consists in designating a speciﬁc
urban (or rural) area, which is depressed, and targeting it for economic development through
government-provided subsidies to labor and capital. The aim of the empowerment zone
program is to revitalize distressed urban communities and it represents a nexus between
social welfare policy and economic development eﬀorts. By implementing these types of
policies, one brings jobs to people and thus facilitates the ﬂows of job information in depressed
neighborhoods.
Policies that promote social integration and thus increase the interracial interactions
between weak ties would also have positive eﬀects on the labor-market outcomes of minority
workers. Such policies, like the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) programs (Katz et al., 2001;
Rosenbaum and Harris, 2001; Kling et al., 2005), have been implemented in the United
States. By giving housing assistance to low-income families, the MTO programs help them
relocate to better and richer neighborhoods.41
(2002) and Bayer et al. (2008).
41See also Beaman (2011) and Edin et al. (2003) who both exploit natural experiments, consisting of
refugee resettlement programs in the U.S. and Sweden, respectively, to try to disentangle social network
referral eﬀects from sorting or correlation in unobservable attributes. Beaman (2011) ﬁnds that a one
standard deviation increase in the number of network members in a given year lowers the employment
probability of someone arriving one year later by 4.9 percentage points. Edin et al. (2003) ﬁnd similar
43In light of our results, our model predicts that, relative to the ‘control’ group, displaced
workers (from low- to high-rental-housing areas) should improve their social network and
therefore their labor outcomes. If labor market participation is a good ‘proxy’ for labor
outcomes, then the ﬁndings of Rosenbaum and Harris (2001) conﬁrm some of the predictions
of our model. Indeed, using the survey data from the MTO program in Chicago, the ﬁndings
of these authors, based on interviews an average of 18 months after families moved from
public housing to higher rental housing areas, show an increase in labor force participation
and employment. More precisely, Rosenbaum and Harris (2001) show that: “After moving
to their new neighborhoods, the Section 8 respondents were far more likely to be actively
participating in the labor force (i.e. working or looking for a job), while for MTO respondents,
a statistically signiﬁcant increase is evident only for employment per se.”
Another way of reducing the unemployment rate of minorities in the context of our model
is to observe that institutional connections can be engineered to create connections between
job seekers and employers in ways that parallel social network processes. For example, schol-
ars like Granovetter (1979) and Wilson (1996) have called for poverty reduction programs
to “create connections” between employers and poor and disadvantaged job seekers. While
labor market intermediaries of all types aim to place workers with employers, especially with
respect to poor populations, there is some disagreement about how these linkages work.
Although strengthening connections being poor job seekers and employers is often seen as
desirable, past research has questioned whether labor market intermediaries actually perform
this function for those most in need. Recently, Autor and Houseman (2010) have argued
that in the low wage sector temporary services can help workers in the short term, but is
not helpful in the longer-term because tempory employment weakens workers’ search eﬀorts
for direct hire jobs. On the employer’s side, a number of studies have shown that employers
often stigmatize low wage workers who are sent to them by public and private labor market
intermediaries (e.g., Laufer and Winship, 2004). In general, employers are concerned that
since intermediaries targeting poor populations specialize in hard-to-employ populations,
candidates referred by these organizations will be adversely selected, constituting the labor
market “left-overs” who could not ﬁnd a job through other means (Autor, 2009; Burtless,
1985; Van Ours, 1994). While low-wage employers generally stigmatize job-seekers sent to
them from labor market intermediary organizations, Fernandez (2010) shows how it is that
such biases can be overcome. To the degree that intermediary organizations can help the ﬁrm
address its recruitment problems, “created connections” can serve as functional substitutes
for social network processes in matching people to jobs. Actors will choose to work with
positive results.
44brokers to the extent that brokers provide goods or services that are of greater value than
those available through alternative means.
To conclude, we believe that weak ties generate ‘bridging’ social capital. Bridging social
capital refers to ties across networks that may make the resources exist in one network
accessible to a member of another. These social relationships enable members to ‘get ahead’.
These are needed to extend beyond family to connect to a broader range of resources and
opportunities that exist in networks to which they are otherwise not connected. If black
workers do not have access to weak ties (especially whites), in particular because they are
segregated and separated from business centers, then their main source of information about
jobs will be provided by their strong ties. But if the latter are themselves unemployed, the
chance of escaping unemployment will be very low.
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54Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We establish the proof in two steps. First, Lemma 1 charac-
terizes all steady-state dyad ﬂows. Lemma 2 then provides conditions for their existence.
Lemma 1 There exists at most two diﬀerent steady-state equilibria: (i) a full-unemployment
equilibrium U such that e∗ = 0 and u∗ = 1, (ii) an interior equilibrium I such that 0 < e∗ < 1
and 0 < u∗ < 1.
Proof. By combining (5) to (8), we easily obtain:
e






We consider two diﬀerent cases.
(i) If e∗ = 0, then equation (50) is satisﬁed. Furthermore, using (5) and (6), this implies
that d∗
1 = d∗
2 = 0 and, using (7) and (9), we have d∗
0 = 1/2 and u∗ = 1. This is referred to as
steady-state U (full unemployment).
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• Let us ﬁrst focus on the case where e∗ = 1. In that case, it has to be that only
d2−dyads exist and thus d∗
0 = d∗
1 = 0, which, using (52) implies that: d∗
2 = 0. So this case is
not possible.
• Let us now thus focus on the case: 0 < e∗ < 1 (which implies that 0 < u∗ < 1)
By plugging (51) and (52) in (7) and after some algebra, we obtain that d∗
0 solves Φ(d∗
0) =

















(i) The steady-state equilibrium U always exists.




(i) In this equilibrium e∗ = 0, which implies that h(e) = (1 − ω)λ and q(e) = 0. There
are only d0−dyads so all workers are unemployed and will never receive a job oﬀer since
q(e) = 0. So when a d0−dyad is formed it is never destroyed and thus this equilibrium is
always sustainable.
(ii) We know from Lemma 1 that a steady-state I exists and that e∗ ￿= 1. We now
have to check that e∗ > 0 and 0 < d∗
0 < 1/2. Let us thus verify whether there exists some
0 < d∗
0 < 1/2 such that Φ(d∗
0) = 0, where Φ(·) is given by (53). We have Φ(0) = (B/2)
2 > 0
and Φ￿(0) = −(1 + Z)/2 < 0. Therefore, (53) has a unique positive root smaller than 1/2
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0 < 1/2 if















0 < 1/2 guarantees that e∗ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:

























































We have a quadratic function that crosses only once the positive orthant. Let us calculate
￿ d0 > 0 the value for which Φ(d0) crosses the d0−axis. For that, we have to solve: Φ(￿ d0) = 0.











It should be clear that if ￿ d0 < 1/2, then Φ(d0) < 0 for 0 < d0 < 1/2 and thus
∂d∗
0
∂ω < 0. Let













































As a result, when δ
λ <
￿ω
6, ￿ d0 < 1/2 and thus
∂d∗
0
∂ω < 0. Since we are in equilibrium I,
















This inequality is equivalent to:
4 + 2
￿




which is always true since ω < 1 and thus 4 > 2







∂ω < 0, then condition (10) is always satisﬁed.




























































































































Since e∗ = 1 − u∗, ∂e∗
∂ω > 0 ⇔ ∂u∗







∂ω < 0, ∂e∗
∂ω > 0, ∂u∗
∂ω < 0, and condition (10) is always satisﬁed.






∂ω cannot be signed.
58Proof of Proposition 10:
Lemma 3 There exist two types of steady-state equilibria: (i) a full-unemployment equilib-
rium U such that e∗
j = 0 and u∗
j = 1, (ii) an interior equilibrium I such that 0 < e∗
j < 1 and
0 < u∗
j < 1, ∀j = B,W.





































We consider the following diﬀerent cases.
(ia) If e∗
B = e∗
W = 0, then equation (54) is satisﬁed. We have that d∗
1j = d∗
2j = 0 and
d∗
0 = Nj/2 and u∗
j = 1. This is referred to as steady-state U (full unemployment).
(ib) If e∗
B = 0 and e∗
W > 0, then solving equation (50) yields for blacks:
0 =







The only way this equation can hold is that e∗
W = 0 (indeed d∗
0B cannot be equal to zero
since this implies that d∗
2B = d∗





1B cannot hold) and we
are back in case (ia) where e∗
B = e∗
W = 0 and steady-state U prevails.
(ic) If e∗
W = 0 and e∗
B > 0, then by a similar reasoning as in case (ib), we end up with
e∗
B = e∗
W = 0 and steady-state U prevails.
(ii) Let us assume that e∗
B > 0 and e∗
W > 0. Let us see if it is possible to have either
e∗
B = 1 or e∗
W = 1 or both. If either e∗
B = 1 or e∗
W = 1 or both e∗
B = e∗





1j/2 < 0, which is impossible. As a result, if e∗
B > 0 and
e∗
W > 0, then it has to be that e∗
B < 1 and e∗
W < 1. We call this steady-state equilibrium I
because it is an interior equilibrium for which 0 < e∗
B < 1 and 0 < e∗
W < 1.
Let us now focus on the case 0 < e∗
B < 1 and 0 < e∗
W < 1 (which implies that 0 < u∗
B < 1
and 0 < u∗
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0B (1 − ωB) − 2λ2ωWd∗
0W (1 − ωW)
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0B (λωB + δ) + ωWd∗
0W (λωW + δ)]
which is (47). In other words, e∗
B+e∗
W only depends on d∗
0B and d∗
0W and exogenous variables.
• Let us now show that e∗
B < e∗

















































60As a result, e∗
B < e∗






































































































Since, by Proposition 9, ωB < ωW, then
λωB (e∗
B + e∗
W − 1) + λ + δ
λωW (e∗
B + e∗
W − 1) + λ + δ
< 1



















If the ratio ωW/ωB is large enough, then this inequality is true.
61